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Abstract
Nowadays, civil transport aircraft designers attach importance to designated fire zone and always ignore the 
flammable fluid leakage zones, which may threaten the safety of aircraft. The main content of the research are as 
follows: Firstly, this paper starts from the civil transport category aircraft flammable fluid related airworthiness 
requirement (§25.863), including the research of development background, related advisory circular and main general 
compliance verification method. The compliance verification process of §25.863 is given. General protection 
measures include drainage and ventilation, separation and isolation of leakage from ignition sources, component 
qualification, cooling air ducts, condition monitoring, detection and accommodation, and fire protection. Secondly, 
design considerations and compliance verification methods of the systems of the civil transport aircraft are given.
Finally, in view of the characteristic of the typical civil transport aircraft configuration, zonal safety analysis method 
is adopted to research the source of ignition control requirement and method, the ventilation and draining design 
requirement and method. The research product is used for the fire protection design and the compliance certification 
of the airworthiness requirement of civil transport aircraft flammable fluid leakage zone.
© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of ENAC.
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Flammable fluid used in civil transport aircraft includes fuel, hydraulic fluid and alcohol, which might 
exist in some zones due to leakage from flammable fluid carrying components (e.g. leakage from tanks, 
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lines, etc.). When ignited by ignition source(a heat source, which is anticipated to occur under the airplane 
operating and environmental conditions, which has sufficient temperature and/or energy to initiate 
combustion of the flammable fluid in question)[1], the flammable fluid may turn to fire disaster. So the 
civil transport aircraft designers should pay attention to control flammable fluid leakage and fire 
protection. In each area where flammable fluids or vapors might escape by leakage of a fluid system, there 
must be means to minimize the probability of ignition of the fluids and vapors, and the resultant hazards if 
ignition does occur.
Fire protection requirement is mainly in subpart D and subpart E of Part 25 “Airworthiness Standards: 
Transport Category Airplanes”. But nowadays, civil transport aircraft designers attach more importance to 
designated fire zone such as engine power section, the engine accessory section, the APU compartment, 
any fuel burning heater, the compressor and accessory sections of turbine engines, and the combustor, 
turbine and tailpipe sections of turbine engine installations that contain lines or components carrying 
flammable fluids and always ignore the flammable fluid leakage zones (any area where flammable liquids 
or vapors are not intended to be present, but where they might exist due to leakage from flammable fluid 
carrying components), which may threaten the safety of aircraft. To help aircraft designers to know 
flammable fluid fire protection airworthiness design and verification method well and then improve the 
safety level of civil transport aircraft, three questions are discussed in this paper.
2. Analysis of §25.863 and general design considerations
There are four clauses for §25.863, and §25.863(a) requires provisions to minimize the probability of 
ignition of leaked flammable fluid or vapors. §25.863(b) requires compliance with (a) by analysis or tests,
and defines applicable conditions. §25.863(c) requires an effective alert for the crew if their action is
necessary in case of a fluid fire. §25.863(d) requires definition and identification of the areas in which the
flammable fluid leakage may occur.
The compliance verification process of c25.863 is as follows (figure 1): (1) estimate the zone and 
determine whether it is a designated fire zone (DFZ), for the DFZ, c25.1181̚c25.1207 is considered; 
(2) for the area that subjects to flammable fluid leakage and contains nominal ignition source, which is 
fire zone, if there are the fail-safe isolation of fluid from ignition source and adequate drainage, then treat 
it as a flammable fluid leakage zone or as a DFZ; (3) for the flammable fluid leakage zone without 
potential ignition source, minimize the hazards if ignition does occur, and for the area with potential 
ignition source, there should be some design features to prevent any single failure from causing both 
leakage and ignition[2].
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Fig. 1. Flow chart for §25.863 compliance
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The following table gives examples of nominal and potential ignition sources, which need to be 
considered for §25.863 compliance [2].
Table 1. Example of nominal and potential ignition sources
IGNITION MECHANISM
IGNITION 
SOURCE 
TYPE
Hot surface -
Temperature >AIT-50°F
Sparking or arcing Naked Flame Hot Fluid 
(Air)
Nominal 
Ignition source
Engine/APU casing
Exhaust ducting
HP bleed duct
Brakes
Electrical equipment
Passenger areas
Electrical terminals - non-
sealed
Electrical equipment.
Passenger/cargo areas
Exhaust gas
Passenger areas
Potential 
ignition source
Electrical cable - normal 
insulator
Electrical cable - in conduit
Electrical cable bundle/loom
Bleed duct
Electrical terminals - non-
sealed
Electrical terminals - sealed
Firewall
Air cycle machine
Electrical equipment
Electrical cable - normal 
insulator
Electrical cable - in conduit
Electrical cable 
bundle/loom
Electrical terminals - non-
sealed
Electrical terminals - sealed
Electrical equipment
Frictional sparks
Passenger/cargo areas
Torching flame
Electrical cable 
bundle/loom
Electrical 
equipment
Engine/APU surge
Tailpipe fire
Passenger/cargo 
areas
Bleed 
duct
For general configuration of civil transport aircraft, flammable fluid leakage zone includes nose cone, 
wing, fuselage, trailing edge and so on where flammable fluid carrying pipelines, electrical wire and 
electric equipments exist at the same time. General protection measures include drainage and ventilation, 
separation and isolation of leakage from ignition sources, component qualification, cooling air ducts, 
condition monitoring, detection and accommodation, and fire protection.
1) Ventilation and Drainage. Leakage source and drainage road analysis, ventilation analysis, ground 
test and flight test are needed.
2) Separation of leakage from ignition sources. When wiring is run parallel to or crossing flammable 
fluid lines, maintain as much separation as possible. Locate wires above or level with the fluid lines and 
not in the same vertical plane. Maintain a minimum separation of six inches. In tight spaces where 
separation is reduced, install clamps or insulating material to assure fluid line contact and arcing are not 
possible. The minimum clearance between wiring and flammable fluid carrying lines should not be less 
than one inch during worst case failure conditions. 
3) Isolation of leakage from ignition sources. Typical means of isolation include shrouds around 
flammable fluid carrying plumbing and components, double walled fuel tanks, and transparent secondary 
coatings on integral tanks, which prevent leakage from sealant leaks or structural cracks, but permit 
detection of these leaks. Partial isolation can also be effective in some situations to minimize both the 
probability of ignition and the resultant hazard if ignition occurs. One example is the use of baffle ribs in
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wing leading edge to allow leakage drainage without the leakage migrating to other areas that could 
increase both the probability of ignition and the size and hazard of the fire if ignition occurs. 
4) Component qualification. Components located in flammable fluid leakage zones should be qualified 
to show that they are not nominal ignition sources. Electrical components may be qualified for use within 
flammable fluid leakage zones by showing the unit meets the appropriate criteria such as the explosion 
proof requirements as defined in AC 25-16[3].
5) Cooling air ducts. The cooling air supply and/or discharge for any electrical, electronic or 
mechanical equipment should be conveyed within the aircraft and discharged from the aircraft so as not to 
create a hazard following failure of the equipment resulting in potential ignition sources such as hot gases, 
flames, or friction sparks. Where required the cooling duct should be fireproof and/or insulated.
6) Condition monitoring, detection and accommodation. It can take many diverse forms including: 
looking for and detecting overboard drainage of flammable fluids during the pre-flight “walk around” 
inspections; overcurrent and/or overheat monitoring within flammable fluid tanks, pumps and/or other 
flammable fluid carrying components; fire and/or overheat monitoring within a flammable fluid leakage 
zone.
7) Protection if ignition occurs. the following provisions have been generally accepted as minimizing 
the hazard if ignition occurs: provide ventilation in areas to minimize the amount of flammable vapors 
resident in the zone; provide ventilation to minimize the probability of the ignition being an explosion; 
provide a means to shut off ventilation airflow, following flight deck indication of a fire; provide the 
maximum practical amount and effectiveness of drainage so as to minimize leakage volume available and 
provide detection to minimize multiple flight leakage exposure; in the case where some residual undrained 
fluid is present, or in the case where drainage is not practical for all phases of flight, consider the effects 
of igniting the residual undrained fluid [2].
3. Design considerations and compliance verification methods of related systems
§25.863 should be considered in the design of civil transport aircraft avionics system, brake system, 
environmental control system, flight controls system, fuel system, hydraulic system, landing gear system, 
powerplant fire protection system, electrical power system, steering system and so on.
Design considerations and compliance verification methods of the above systems of one certain civil
aviation aircraft type are given and it can be a guidance.
1) Avionics system. avionics system components were properly bonded to aircraft structure, 
minimizing the possibility of sparking and the avionics system installation provided adequate separation, 
segregation, and isolation to meet the requirements. Compliance was demonstrated by design review and 
inspection.
2) Brake system. Adequate system separation, segregation and isolation of services will be adopted to 
meet the requirements and brake system will be analyzed for ignition hazards with consideration for 
flammability characteristics of fluids, including effects of any combustible or absorbing material. The 
brake temperature monitoring system will be analyzed for ignition hazards identifying any flight crew 
action and means used to alert the crew to prevent or counteract a fluid fire. Compliance will be shown by 
safety assessment and design review.
3) Environmental control system. Hot surfaces of bleed line and ECS packs are insulated. The
maximum touch temperature in the external insulation will not exceed 200ć in the worst case condition 
(Hot day and Sea Level). Should a bleed leakage occur, automatic protection with adequate indication to 
crew is provided. ECS will be installed in the region outside of fire zone. Automatic shutoff means will be 
provided to segregate the fire. This requirement will be demonstrated by design review, Inspection and 
safety assessment.
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4) Flight controls system. Adequate system separation, segregation and isolation regarding hot flight 
controls components surfaces, wiring and possible flammable fluid leakage will be adopted to minimize 
the probability of ignition as described in the system description.
5) Fuel system. Compliance by safety assessment that the fuel lines and components are located so that 
harmful or hazardous concentrations of vapors cannot enter compartments occupied by passengers or 
crew. Electrical harnesses are clamped to maintain separation from fuel lines by use of standard p-clamps. 
Droops in harness installation prevent fluid from running into connectors. Selected wiring is shielded 
within a harness cover and with boots over connectors. Connector pins are sized for the electrical loads 
carried so the connectors do not operate hot nor have the potential to spark. Aircraft structures are 
provided with adequate means for drainage of fuel which would be released in the event of a leakage in 
the line. To eliminate any dangerous concentrations of fuel vapors, areas where they could accumulate are 
vented to ambient. The Fuel System will be analyzed for ignition hazards with consideration for 
flammability characteristics of fuel, including effects of any combustible or absorbing material. 
Compliance will be demonstrated by design review and safety assessment, and Compliance by design 
review showing that the fuel system alerts the flight crew and provides quick acting means to prevent or 
counteract a fuel fire[4].
6) Hydraulic system. Electrical harnesses are clamped to maintain separation from hydraulic lines. 
Droops in harness installation prevent fluid from running into connectors. Where necessary, wiring is 
shielded with a harness cover and with boots over connectors. Connectors pins are sized for electrical 
loads so the connectors do not operate hot or have the potential to spark. The aircraft is provided with 
adequate drainage. To eliminate dangerous concentrations of vapor, areas where it could accumulate are
vented to ambient. The hydraulic fluid is fire resistant. AS 1241 phosphate ester fluid is to be used; 
covered in fire hazard report [5]. All hydraulic power supply system components are non-absorbent of the 
jet fuel and phosphate ester hydraulic fluid on-board, and are non-combustible or at least fire-resistant. 
Areas of potential fluid fire are identified and defined in system description. Drainage collection points 
are externally visible, overflow containers are semitransparent. Compliance is shown by design review
and safety assessment.
7) Landing gear system. The landing gear system will be analyzed for ignition hazards with 
consideration to possible sources and path for fluid leakage, and means of detecting leakage. The landing 
gear system will be analyzed for ignition hazards with consideration for flammability characteristics of 
fluids, including effects of any combustible or absorbing material. Compliance will be demonstrated by 
design review and safety assessment.
8) Powerplant fire protection. The powerpant will be analyzed for ignition hazards with consideration 
to possible sources and path for fluid leakage, and means of detecting leakage. The powerplant will be 
analyzed for ignition hazards with consideration for flammability characteristics of fuel, engine oil and 
hydraulic fluid including the effects of any combustible or absorbing material. Compliance will be 
demonstrated by analysis. Compliance will be demonstrated by design review showing that the propulsion 
system will be analyzed for ignition hazards, identifying any flight crew action and the means used 
(EICAS message) to alert the crew to prevent or counteract a fire. Compliance by analysis will 
demonstrate that all the engine zones have been analyzed and classified. The inlet and reverser zones have 
been classified as no flammable fluid zones. The fan compartment is a flammable fluid zone and the core 
compartment is a fire zone.
9) Electrical power. Isolation is provided between feeder cables and wiring bundles carrying electrical 
power from the flammable fluids zones as far as practical. Where necessary, in the zones exposed to 
flammable fluids, the wiring and cables have additional protection through thermal sleeving. Electrical 
power system equipment present in normal operation condition, no exposed sparks or temperatures above 
the limit to ignite flammable fluids [3].
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10) Steering system. Adequate system separation, segregation and isolation of services will be adopted 
to meet the requirements. Possible fluid sources are sufficiently segregated from potential ignition sources. 
Design precautions minimize the possible leakage of fluid and assure proper drainage. Highest 
temperatures of components are lower than the auto ignition temperature of the fluid. Compliance will be 
shown by safety analysis. It will be shown on the Flammable Fluid Fire Protection Report that the highest 
temperature that can occur inside the NLG compartment is lower than the AIT (auto ignition temperature) 
of the hydraulic fluid. The design has separated the flammable fluid from their potential ignition sources. 
No crew action will be required to prevent or counteract a fluid fire associated with the steering system.
4. Zonal analysis
Zonal analysis is adopted to research the source of ignition control requirement and method (including 
source of ignition characteristic, distribution, isolation, monitoring, ignition probability and other analysis 
method and compliance to the airworthiness requirement), the ventilation and draining design requirement 
and method (including the drain vents form, the arrangement of import and export, ventilation path). 
Firstly, type installation rules should be given. General design considerations (ventilation, drainage, 
separation and Isolation) that are mentioned in the first chapter are embodied in the type installation rules. 
Take ventilation for exampleˈa suitable ventilation is provided to all zones. The air escaping from the 
passenger cabin is charged with humidity and moisture. When entering non-pressurized compartments 
through permanent leaks or relief valves, condensation may occur, which it is necessary to control and 
drain. Consequently equipment items especially electrical ones exposed to water droplets are protected.
Within a same zone, the primary rule is to install the electrical wirings and air system separated from each 
other in the upper part of the zone and to install fluids at the lower part, in order to prevent a possible 
seepage from polluting and setting fire to other systems. Zones including flammable fluids are properly 
ventilated to raise the self-ignition threshold up.
Secondly, related system specifications should be given, including pneumatic system, cabin air 
circulation system, fuel systems, hydraulic system, oxygen system, water and toilet system, rain repellent 
system, fire extinguishing system, electrical system and so on. Take oxygen system for exampleˈ
Material, fittings, bonding and arrangement information should be given and how to accord with the 
airworthiness requirement. Such as adequate ventilation is provided around the oxygen cylinder and pipes 
to quickly disperse any oxygen leak, and all the lines are routed as far away as possible from high power 
feeders wires, hydraulic lines and any greased element. The number of intermediate fittings is reduced to 
the minimum compatible with the conditions of installation.
Thirdly, system inter-relation should be given to analyze what systems and in what conditions will 
cause the fire that will be referenced for zonal analysis. System inter-relation effect of one certain aircraft 
type is referred to table 2 (1- short circuit + fire, 2 - fire, 3 - crew availability and 4 - malfunction).
Table 2 system inter-relation effect
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Finally, the aircraft type should be divided to several zones, and it depends on type configuration. In
general, the zones can include pylon zone, mechanical bay, stub, under baggage compartment, wing 
leading edge, trailing edge, horizontal stabilizer, main wheel well, center compartment, fuselage zone 
baggage compartment, passenger cabin and cockpit, nose cone and so on. General description, 
arrangement, fire risk precautions and systems analysis should be given for each zone.
Take mechanical bay for examples hereˈthe fire risk in this zone is due to the proximity in the same 
zone of the following systems:
1) Hot air versus fuel and fuel pressurization pipes.
2) Hot air versus hydraulic pipes.
3) Hydraulic pipes versus electrical system.
4) Fuel pipes versus electrical system.
Precautions taken include:
1) All the components installed close to the APU firewall are installed on a thick honeycomb panel 
which protects from direct heat conduction in case of a fire in the center engine or APU bays. This panel 
has a metallic skin for bonding purposes. In addition, the mechanical bay is fitted with a fire detection and 
extinguishing system.
2) Hot air versus fuel and fuel pressurization pipes. In flight the pre-coolers installed in the pylons 
control the air temperature below 204°C. On ground during APU use, the temperature can reach 260°C.
The center engine air inlet anti-icing line is surrounded by a dual skin pipe, drained and fully ventilated, 
preventing therefore any possible contact between fuel vapor and hot air pipes. A forced ventilation in the 
zone carries away possible fuel vapor.
3) Hot air versus hydraulic pipes. In flight the pre-cooler installed in the pylon controls the air 
temperature under 204°C. On ground during APU use, the temperature can reach 260°C. In addition, the 
center engine air inlet anti-icing line is surrounded by a dual skin pipe, drained and fully ventilated, 
preventing therefore any possible contact between fuel vapor and hot air pipes. Forced ventilation carries 
away possible hydraulic vapor.
4) Hydraulic and fuel system versus electrical system. The layout of the zone is made in order to 
prevent any fluid leakage directly on an electrical connector. The wirings are routed as far apart as 
117 Ning Yue et al. /  Procedia Engineering  80 ( 2014 )  110 – 118 
possible from the hydraulic lines and above these ones to prevent any leak of hydraulic fluid from 
reaching the electrical connectors. In addition and whenever possible, to prevent any water ingestion in 
the connectors, the electrical connectors are mounted horizontally or upward and back-shells are installed
downward creating therefore a low point in the wiring. All electrical components installed in the 
mechanical bay are explosion proof.
5) Ventilation. The presence in this area of a large number of systems and mainly hydraulic and air
pipes requires that the zone be thoroughly ventilated. At ground, two different cases have to be considered:
x Door opened: air enters through the rear compartment access door and exits through the upper outlets 
located between frames and in the stub aft lateral fairing.
x Door closed: air enters from the RH side at one certain Frame, through the ground actuated negative 
pressure relief valve and exits mainly through the two upper outlets located between frames and a 
louver on each side of the aft fairing panel of the Stub permit also air evacuation.
During flight, without the anti-icing system the principle is as follows: air enters at the upper part 
between two frames through two symmetrical outlets and exits in the lower part of the LH and RH panels 
between two frames and through two outlets located on either side of the lower aft lateral panel of the stub.
During flight, with the anti-icing system in use, the airflow comes from the stub to the outlet in the 
mechanical bay.
6) Drainage. The presence in this area of a large number of systems requires that the zone be
thoroughly drained. Frames and stringers possess holes that are used as natural drains in case of water
condensation and/or any other fluid leak. The worst flammable fluid leakage case identified by analysis in 
the zone is due to a misassembly of a fuel line coupling without the o-ring or a deterioration of that 
element.
Depending on the source leakage location, every liquid flowing in that compartment is :
x either drained between the two structural beams to the lowest point aft of one certain frame in the 
aircraft’s plane of symmetry where a 8mm-diameter hole is located.
x or drained outboard those two beams by the fuselage panels up to one certain frame where a structural 
drain hole made up by parts assembly discharge the flow in the under baggage compartment area. 
Moreover a ventilation closure cloth located at a higher level on the one certain frame is soft enough to 
open under additional liquid pressure, thus enhancing the drainage.
Each battery located aft of one certain frame is contained in a stainless steel casing installed on the 
floor. To prevent from creating an additional hazard due to reingestion of flammable fluid drained 
upstream of the mechanical bay, some devices are added above the latches and the drain holes in the 
mechanical door.
5. Conclusion and suggestion
Analysis of §25.863 and general design considerations, related systems design considerations and 
zonal analysis process of one certain aircraft type are given in this paper. The research product is used for 
the fire protection design and the compliance certification of the airworthiness requirement of civil
transport aircraft flammable fluid leakage zone.
Generally speaking, methods of compliance that include MC1 (descriptions and drawings), MC2 
(calculation, analysis and similarity analysis), MC3 (safety assessment), MC5 (ground test), MC6 (flight 
test), MC7 (inspection), MC9 (equipment qualification) should be used to compliance with §25.863. The 
methods of compliance may differ from each other for different aircraft configurations. Fire hazard 
minimization can be considered to be that which is technically feasible and economically practical and it 
is noted that there may be more reliance on fail safe design, qualitative assessment and engineering 
judgment than quantitative probabilities. The design information of certain aircraft type in this paper can 
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be an advice for aircraft type, however, the design considerations and zonal analysis should be made 
according to aircraft configuration.
References
[1] Zuodi Zheng, Transport aircraft airworthiness standards technology consultation handbook.
[2] AC 25.863-1 draft, Flammable fluid fire protection.
[3] AC 25-16, Electrical fault and fire prevention and protection.
[4] AC 20-53A, Protection of airplane fuel systems against fuel vapor ignition due to lightning.
[5] Society of Automotive Engineers, Fire resistant phosphate ester hydraulic fluid for aircraft, aerospace standard AS 1241C.
